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During the Second World War, both the Allied and Axis governments 
expended significant resources in 
the production and dissemination 
of propaganda. Directed at their 
own people, the propaganda of 
these governments fostered correct 
thinking, feelings, attitudes, and 
behaviours. Directed at military 
personnel of enemy nations as part 
of psychological warfare operations, 
this propaganda was far more subversive. Its goal 
was to undermine the efficiency and coherence 
of enemy forces and, ultimately, to weaken their 
will to fight. Among the different media harnessed 
to achieve this end, aerial leaflets hold a unique 
place in the history of psychological warfare 
operations. Their efficacy was debated during and 
after the war yet these leaflets were disseminated 
in the millions and collected by soldiers of both 
sides.1 It is for this reason, among others, that 
although inherently ephemeral, Second World 
War leaflets have been preserved in archival 
collections, including the George Metcalf Archives 
of the Canadian War Museum.2 In the following 
pages, we will highlight 12 leaflets from this 
collection, six produced by the Psychological 
Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Expeditionary Force (PWD)3 and six by the SS 
Standarte Kurt Eggers of the German Waffen SS 
(SKE),4 all of which encourage enemy combatants 
to surrender. But what arguments did the 
psychological warriors of the opposing sides 
think would convince their target audiences to 
take this step? What inducements did they offer? 
What justifications did they provide? And in what 
ways were the leaflets produced by the opposing 
sides different or the same? 
 This exercise is undertaken less 
to compare the efficacy of the leaflets, 
although we will address this issue 
in our conclusion, and more to 
explore the variety of considerations 
that both sides attempted to balance 
in their efforts to induce surrender. 
We offer this analysis with due 
caution for we recognize that our 
sample is incomplete. While the 
George Metcalf Archives holds 
35 PWD leaflets which promote surrender, its 
collection of corresponding German leaflets is 
significantly smaller. Indeed, we show here the six 
that are the least damaged. We also acknowledge 
that we employ the English translations of the 
original German leaflets that were prepared by 
PWD in an effort to overcome the reluctance of 
operational personnel to deliver, via aircraft and 
artillery, what some referred to as “bumpf” or 
“confetti” and others, slightly more colourfully, 
as “bumwad.”5 We cannot, therefore, make 
definitive statements about the language use and 
tone employed in these PWD leaflets.6 And yet 
the similarities and differences are nonetheless 
striking, indicative not only of certain shared 
philosophies about propaganda techniques but 
also of different attitudes toward the enemy 
audience. Before turning to a detailed exploration 
of the individual leaflets, we will first outline in 
general terms their similarities and differences.
 Whether Allied or German, both psychological 
warfare organizations anticipated that soldiers, 
not knowing how they would be treated as 
prisoners of war, might be afraid to surrender. To 
assuage this fear, two themes were stressed: 1) 
respect for the terms of the Geneva Convention, 
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and 2) the good conditions enjoyed by prisoners 
of war. Recognizing that a sense of honour might 
deter a soldier from surrendering, both sides 
also emphasized that this act did not sully his 
honour. To surrender did not imply cowardice 
but rather was a step forced upon a soldier for 
whom the alternative was, at worst, death and, 
at best, permanent disablement. To increase the 
leaflet’s persuasiveness, both sides featured not 
only photographs of prisoners of war enjoying 
comfort and security in their camps but also 
quotes in which prisoners often express surprise 
at, and always satisfaction with, their treatment. 
Very simply, all 12 leaflets told their enemy 
audience that the POW would be sure to return 
home safely whereas the same could not be said 
of the fighting soldier.
 Although the leaflets evince some similarities 
in theme and technique, they also manifest 
certain differences. The CWM sample suggests 
that PWD presented more inducements and 
justifications in advocating surrender to the 
German soldier. Leaflets reminded him of Allied 
material superiority, explained the meaning of 
capitulation on a personal and national level, and 
declared that desertion, requiring a particular 
kind of courage not held by all soldiers, was an 
acceptable route to a prisoner of war camp.7 The 
leaflets produced by PWD and SKE also employ 
a different tone. PWD leaflets attempted to reach 
German soldiers by addressing them as rational 
individuals capable of thinking for themselves 
and of making sensible decisions once presented 
with the truth.8 Truth, it must be noted, did 
not dictate honesty; PWD adopted the axiom of 
propaganda that to be persuasive, leaflets had to 
be credible.9 In contrast, leaflets generated by the 
propaganda units of the SKE were generally more 
strident in tone. German propagandists used 
language rich in superlatives and attempted 
to play on the emotions of their 
audience. That 
they chose this 
technique does 
not necessarily 
imply a lesser 
commitment to 
the truth. Indeed, 
PWD experts have 
argued that “Nazi 
p r o p a g a n d i s t s 
had to observe the 
rules of accurate 
reporting, when they wanted to believed, just as 
carefully as the Allies.”10 And yet at the same time, 
one of these same experts noted that, according to 
the Nazis, the job of propaganda was to “persuade 
people to accept any given view favourable to 
policy, irrespective of its truth or falsity.”11 For 
the Nazis, truth as well as lies had a role to play. 
The tone of certain SKE leaflets also suggests that 
German propagandists attempted to establish a 
sense of camaraderie with the enemy, an effort 
which our sample indicates was not made by 
PWD. While leaflets of the latter organization 
promised good and fair treatment for POWs and 
for Germany at war’s end, they did not suggest 
that German and Allied soldiers should become 
friends nor employ a tone which suggested a kind 
of fellow-feeling as certain of the SKE leaflets did. 
We will now turn to a detailed exploration of the 
12 leaflets beginning first with the six produced 
by the SKE and then turning to the six produced 
by PWD.
German Leaflet Propaganda
Directed at the Allies
“Germany strictly observing Geneva Convention” (AI – 069-7-4412) was a 
propaganda leaflet first distrubed in July 1944. 
It states that even the bravest soldier may reach 
a point where continued fighting would lead to 
pointless self-destruction.13 A justifiable response 
in such circumstances, and one that all nations 
accept, is surrender. Should a soldier reach this 
point, the leaflet continues, he should know what 
will happen to him. First, he will be taken to a 
Dulag, which although “no hotel,” is nonetheless 
as comfortable as nearness to the front permits. 
Here he will receive medical care, if needed, and 
w i l l be given the opportunity 
to send a message home. 
Second, the soldier will 
be transferred to a Stalag, 
a permanent camp, 
up-to-date, and with 
all the conveniences. 
These include: modern 
kitchens in which to 
prepare the ample 
and high quality food 
with which POWs 
are provided; clean 
and airy rooms, 
which soldiers can 
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decorate to their taste; 
lavatories and toilets of 
high sanitary standard; 
and,  a th le t i c  f i e lds , 
complete with sporting 
equipment. Moreover, while 
imprisoned in a Stalag, 
prisoners will be given an 
opportunity to learn a trade, 
to pursue a university degree, 
or to study fine arts. Third, 
the soldier will no longer have 
to fight. He “will return home 
safe and sound after the war.”
 Perhaps anticipating that 
some Allied soldiers might 
r ema in  unmoved  by  the 
blandishments of leaflets in which 
the German voice predominates, 
another leaflet, “Excerpts from recent letters 
from P.o.W’s.” (AI – 082-7-44), also disseminated 
in July 1944, uses the voice of Allied personnel, 
all identified by name and all but one by service 
number.14 Supporting the leaflet’s central message 
that wounded “P.o.W’s. are well treated,” these 
excerpts all speak to the high quality medical 
attention that these injured prisoners received 
from the Germans. Like all of the leaflets, this 
one also stresses that POWs “will return home 
after the war.” It does, however, have yet another 
more subtle message to communicate. The 
following sentiment, purportedly penned by 
Sapper K. Thompson, is the clearest expression 
of this message: “[I]t seems so terrible that we 
are fighting against one another.” Addressing the 
sense of camaraderie that developed between 
the supposed enemies, Rifleman H. Kidd wrote: 
“We have made friends with lots of German 
chaps, we have fine times trying to teach each 
other our different languages.” Reinforcing the 
idea of the links of friendship, brotherhood, 
and camaraderie that could and should flourish 
amongst Allied and German forces is the 
photograph concluding the leaflet, showing two 
German soldiers carrying a wounded American 
soldier to a First Aid station. On another level, 
this image also highlights the humanity of the 
German soldier as proof of the fact that Allied 
personnel, upon laying down their arms, would 
have nothing to fear.
  Stark in its simplicity, one of the leaflets 
produced by the Propaganda-Einsatz-Fürher 
Organization (∆ 137 5 4415) and 
disseminated in May 1944, lists on one 
side the names of prisoners of war, over which 
is superimposed the words, “The P.O.W. will 
safely return!”16 The obverse lists the names 
of war dead, over which is superimposed the 
words, “The dead will never return!” In addition 
to the blunt statement that prisoners of war will 
survive the conflict, the leaflet communicates 
another, more subtle, message. Configured to 
resemble a newspaper announcement, the list 
of names of prisoners of war is capped with 
the heading “The Roll of Honour.” In choosing 
these words, the leaflet’s authors imply that the 
decision to surrender is not a dishonourable one. 
A deeper analysis reveals still more interesting 
details: 31 of the 33 names of the dead, one of 
which is repeated twice, can be verified using 
the Commonwealth War Graves Commission 
database.17 This suggests that the list of prisoners 
of war is accurate. But does the accuracy of the list 
of dead lead to believable propaganda? Is it likely 
that soldiers who knew any of the 31 dead men 
picked up the leaflet, read it, and subsequently 
internalized the message that surrender was both 
desirable and honourable? These are questions 
for which we have no answers. 
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“The P.O.W. will safely return!” contains the 
subtle message that there is no dishonour 
in surrender. The German propagandists’ 
attempted to enhance the leaﬂet’s credibility 
and impact by featuring on its obverse a list of 
33 dead, superimposed over which are 
the words: “The Dead Will 
Never Return!”
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Like Allied propagandists, the 
Germans used photographs of 
prisoners-of-war and quotes 
from their letters to prove their 
assertion that they respected 
the terms of the Geneva 
Convention.
CWM 19880045-002
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 In terms of the number of photographs and 
the amount of text that it features, “Men in the 
Shadow? No—Men in the SUN!” (∆ 140/8 44), 
disseminated in August 1944, is unique.18 While 
only one of the other five leaflets includes a 
photograph, this one has 21. It also features more 
text than the other five leaflets, much of it recycled 
from the others. As such, it states that those who 
became POWs surrendered to avoid “senseless 
self-destruction.” This choice was no reflection 
on their bravery but rather evidence of their good 
sense. The leaflet also includes the five “Excerpts 
from recent letters from P.o.W’s” (AI – 082-7-
44). As well, the leitmotif of German leaflets 
promoting surrender is featured prominently as 
the leaflet’s concluding line: “…[A]nd they all will 
safely return!” The principle point of the leaflet, 
however, is that Germany respects the terms 
of the Geneva Convention. Using the text from 
the leaflet entitled, “Germany strictly observing 
Geneva Convention” (AI – 069-7-44), it discusses 
the high quality living conditions, the abundant 
and excellent food, and the opportunities for 
self improvement and healthful exercise. The 
21 photographs, from which healthy, active, 
vital men smile at the viewer from the page, 
are intended to illustrate the superior standard 
of living enjoyed by Allied prisoners-of-war. Of 
course, these images also are supposed to serve 
as incontrovertible proof of Germany’s adherence 
to the terms of the Convention.
 The final two SKE leaflets to be considered 
here are unique in that they were directed 
specifically at Canadian soldiers. The first, asking 
“Are Canadians Cowards?,”19 answers: “Never 
has anybody dared to assert that. Even Canada’s 
enemies rank Canadians among the world’s 
best soldiers.” Why, then, did the leaflet pose 
the question? The answer is found in another 
passage, which states that official sources quote 
the minister of defence, A.G.L. McNaughton, 
as saying that more than 6,500 out of 16,000 
newly-drafted Canadians deserted. These men 
were not cowards, the leaflet asserts, but simply 
sensible individuals who saw no point in fighting 
in Europe, allied with Bolsheviks, when there 
was work to be done on Canadian farms and in 
Canadian industry. Somewhat incongruously, 
the leaflet also notes that “men [were] wanted to 
use dynamite for peaceful purposes,” describing 
how this explosive was employed in the lumber 
industry. Addressing Canadian soldiers directly, 
the back of the leaflet declares: “You are again to 
assume the offensive. In case you should come 
into a hopeless situation don’t lose courage. 
Germany treats prisoners of war according to 
the (sic) Hague and Geneva Conventions. Your 
soldier’s honour will be respected.” Its final shot: 
“Better come across than get a cross.”
 The final leaflet, disseminated in December 
1944 and entitled “Soldiers of the First Canadian 
Army Corps!” (* 383/12 4420), is more subtle 
in that it does not explicitly call on Canadians 
to surrender.21 It does, however, imply that 
surrender is the only way to survive the war. 
Employing at first a wry, somewhat conspiratorial 
tone, suggesting fellow feeling, it reminds 
Canadians that “[f]or over a year you have been 
in Italy and for more than a year you have been 
travelling up and down this damned Italian boot. 
You have fought one battle after another with ever 
increasing losses.” Becoming sympathetic in tone, 
it then reminds Canadians of the misery of that 
past year of fighting, making specific reference to 
particularly costly Canadian battles: “Remember 
Ortona? You were ordered to take it and in the 
course of bitter street fighting you suffered 
ENORMOUS losses.” Switching to outrage, the 
leaflet continues, “You were called again when 
without regard for losses you were ordered to 
break through German defences. Whenever big 
losses were the order of the day the cry was: 
Like Allied propagandists, the 
Germans used photographs of 
prisoners-of-war and quotes 
from their letters to prove their 
assertion that they respected 
the terms of the Geneva 
Convention.
CWM 19880045-002
The unknown Canadian who 
preserved this leaﬂet, noting on its 
face, “German propaganda ﬁred 
over to us in shells,” apparently 
viewed it more as a curiosity to be 
saved as a souvenir than as an 
inducement to surrender, despite its 
avowal of German respect for The 
Hague and Geneva conventions.
CWM 19700149-001
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C A N U C K S  T O 
THE FRONT” And all of this 
for “foreign interests!” As an accompanying 
cartoon clearly illustrates, Canadians were 
sacrificial lambs, forced to fight when the British, 
the Americans, and the Soviets each passed the 
proverbial buck. The leaflet ultimately asks: 
“Are you going to wait until thousands of your 
pals and perhaps you yourself will drown in 
the icy water of the mighty Po river (sic) which 
is more than 5100 feet wide? Are you going to 
wait until the rest of your division will freeze to 
death in the ice-regions of the Alps?” The “only 
one Canadian answer to all this”: “No! Finish up 
with Europe. We want to go home. Remember; 
The most important thing about a war is: To get 
home alive!”
Allied Leaflet Propaganda
Directed at the Germans
Leaflets issued by the Allied Psychological Warfare Div is ion (PWD) repeatedly 
emphasised that captivity was no joke. A 
soldier did not seek captivity “because the 
life of a prisoner appealed to him,”22 but 
because captivity meant safety. A pamplet 
disseminated by the RCAF on the night 
of 12/13 March 194523 declared: “Better 
free than a prisoner of war. Better a 
prisoner of war than dead.”24 Indicative 
of the considerable overlap in themes 
on the PWD leaflets, this one then 
explains that the “1,000,000 German 
soldiers in the West are now in safety” 
because the Allies adhere to the 
principles of the Geneva Convention. 
After outlining what this adherence 
meant in terms of the treatment of 
prisoners of war, the leaflet then 
instructed soldiers: “If you have 
to quit, remove your weapons, 
helmet and belt. Raise your hands, 
wave something white and shout to the 
Allied soldiers Ei Sörrender!” Use of the phrase 
“if you have to quit” is interesting for it subtly 
suggests that German soldiers could be forced 
to surrender by circumstances beyond their 
control. In such cases, being taken prisoner was 
not dishonourable but an unfortunate necessity. 
It reinforces the more direct statement: “Many 
[of your comrades] came into captivity quite 
against their will, but in a hopeless situation 
they had to choose between death and life.” The 
reader of the leaflet, it is inferred, must make 
a similar decision. Equally interesting is the 
German phonetic spelling of the English phrase “I 
surrender,” which was included for two reasons: 
1) to respond to the fear of the German soldier 
that he would be killed trying to surrender25; and 
2) “to make the German familiar and at home 
with the idea of surrender, so that the switch-over 
to action (would become) that much easier.”26
 Many of the leaflets in the ZG series 
emphasized the good treatment received by 
German prisoners of war. Like the German 
leaflet, “Men in the Shadow?,” the PWD leaflet 
German propagandists employed a cartoon, bolded text, 
exclamation points, and emotional language in an effort 
to create a sense of outrage in this leaﬂet’s Canadian 
recipients. Note the code * 383 / 12 44, which identiﬁes 
this leaﬂet as one produced by the Sudstern (Southern 
Star) section of the Skorpion South Propaganda 
organization, attached to the German 10th Army.
Like other Psychological Warfare 
Division leaﬂets, “In Safety!” 
recapitulates the main points of the 
Geneva Convention so that German 
soldiers would not be afraid to surrender. 
To help them still more, the leaﬂet 
includes the phrase “Ei Sörrender!,” the 
German phonetic spelling of the English, 
“I Surrender!”
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entitled “What does the other 
side look like? (ZG 113)”27 and 
disseminated the night of 22/23 
February 1945 over Losheim, 
Lebach, and Saarbrucken,28 
uses photographs to provide 
visual support to the words 
and so make its written 
assertions more credible. 
First noting that German 
POWs had not fought any 
less courageously than those 
still fighting, it maintains that 
they had been faced with a hopeless situation 
and, as such, recognized that there was nothing 
to be gained by continued fighting. Stating that 
the Allies respected the Geneva Convention, the 
leaflet continues: “The following series of pictures 
gives a sober and factual description of the life of 
captured German soldiers during the first days of 
captivity.” The first photograph, showing a line of 
captured German soldiers and captioned “This 
can happen to anyone,” constitutes yet another 
effort by PWD to accustom German soldiers to 
the idea of surrender by implying that there was 
no dishonour in it. The next five photographs 
show men being fed their first meal in captivity, 
receiving first aid, being transported to a transit 
camp, undergoing processing as prisoners of 
war, and busily writing letters to loved ones. But 
it is the final graphic on the leaflet, a Red Cross 
card and its accompanying caption, which are 
particularly striking. Noting that a card is sent to 
the Red Cross in Geneva and also to prisoners’ 
families, the final statement reads: “The card 
contains nothing about the circumstances of 
capture.” The underlying message of this leaflet?: 
a German soldier and/or his family might 
consider surrender to be shameful but official 
Red Cross documents would not divulge how he 
entered captivity.
German propagandists employed a cartoon, bolded text, 
exclamation points, and emotional language in an effort 
to create a sense of outrage in this leaﬂet’s Canadian 
recipients. Note the code * 383 / 12 44, which identiﬁes 
this leaﬂet as one produced by the Sudstern (Southern 
Star) section of the Skorpion South Propaganda 
organization, attached to the German 10th Army.
Like other Psychological Warfare 
Division leaﬂets, “In Safety!” 
recapitulates the main points of the 
Geneva Convention so that German 
soldiers would not be afraid to surrender. 
To help them still more, the leaﬂet 
includes the phrase “Ei Sörrender!,” the 
German phonetic spelling of the English, 
“I Surrender!”
This “sober and factual 
description of the life of captured 
German soldiers” also features 
a facsimile of a Red Cross Card, 
which the leaﬂet helpfully points 
out “contains nothing about 
the circumstances of capture.” 
Clearly marked as a translation 
of ZG 113, the Psychological 
Warfare Division translated 
leaﬂets like this to overcome 
the reluctance of operational 
personnel to disseminate them 
instead of explosives.
CWM 1994004-371
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Almost 
al l  PWD aerial 
leaflets emphasized the fact 
that the Allies respected the terms 
of the Geneva Convention. Of the leaflets 
featuring this theme, however, “Safe Conduct 
(ZG 76),”29 disseminated at the end of October 
1944,30 is unique. Crafted and reworked over 
time in response to comments from newly-
captured German soldiers, the “Safe Conduct” 
pass was considered to be one of PWD’s most 
effective leaflets.31 To make it appear official, the 
leaflet was stamped with the seals of the British 
and American armies along with a facsimile of 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s signature. This 
signature, historian James Erdmann maintains, 
“transformed the leaflet from a simple appeal to 
surrender into an official contract of conditions 
binding both the soldier giving himself up and 
those taking him captive.”32 Equally important 
is the text. In English and German, 
the front declares that the “German 
soldier who carries this safe conduct 
is using it as a sign of his genuine 
wish to give himself up.” The soldier 
carrying it, the leaflet continues, 
is to be disarmed, well looked 
after, fed, given medical attention 
as required, and removed from 
the danger zone as soon as possible. The 
obverse of the leaflet outlines the “Basic Principles 
of International Law Regarding POWs (according 
to the Convention of The Hague, 1907, and the 
Geneva Convention, 1929).” These are: 1) From 
the moment of surrender, German soldiers are 
regarded as prisoners of war; 2) Prisoners are 
taken to assembly points away from danger; 3) 
Prisoners receive the same quantity and quality 
of food as Allied soldiers and the same hospital 
care; 4) Prisoners’ valuables and decorations 
are not taken from them; 5) Prisoners are 
accommodated in facilities equal to that of Allied 
garrison troops; and 6) Prisoners are subject 
neither to reprisals nor to public curiosity. 
Reflecting feedback from German POWs that they 
had been uncertain how to surrender safely, the 
leaflet concludes with “Rules for Surrender”: “To 
prevent misunderstandings when surrendering, 
the following procedure is advisable: Lay down 
arms, take off helmet and belt, raise your hands 
and wave a handkerchief or this leaflet.”
Sporting the seals of the 
British and American armies 
and a facsimile of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s signature, this 
leaflet seemed like an official 
contract to many of its German 
recipients. The Psychological 
Warfare Division deemed it one of 
its most successful leaﬂets. 
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With its emotion-laden 
language, this Psychological 
Warfare Division leaﬂet 
emphasizes what Allied material 
superiority would mean to the 
poorly equipped German soldier: 
death, permanent disability, or 
capture. The smart soldier would 
accept that conditions forced his 
surrender. 
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 As we have seen, PWD leaflets repeatedly 
suggested that surrender could be forced upon a 
soldier, that it could happen to anyone, and that it 
was not something about which a soldier should 
be ashamed. In addition to advocating surrender, 
however, PWD leaflets also presented desertion 
as an option for the German soldier to consider. 
But how did the leaflets make this option 
palatable? If surrender could be interpreted as 
not sullying a soldier’s honour, could desertion 
also be so interpreted? One leaflet purporting to 
use the voice of a deserter, “A So-Called Austrian 
Troublemaker,” reads: “Yes, I am a deserter, but 
I claim that a man sometimes needs a lot more 
courage to desert than to keep sitting in his fox 
hole.”33 The leaflet entitled, “In the North it Might 
Have Made Sense (ZG 109),”34 highlights Allied 
material superiority as a reason for wanting to 
stop fighting and desert. Declaring “YOU TOO 
CAN BECOME A PRISONER OF WAR,” it lists the 
different routes to achieving this status: 1) in an 
enemy counter-attack; 2) by a counter-attack of 
one’s own; 3) while scouting on combat patrol; 4) 
by an enemy flank attack; 5) by being cut off and 
separated. Still another way was by “so-called 
desertion: That is not something for everybody,” 
the leaflet declares. “There are soldiers who 
decide that by fighting on they cannot help 
Germany and that post-war Germany will 
need them for the job of reconstruction. 
But to desert, one needs courage, iron 
determination and—a proper opportunity.” 
The leaflet concludes with the assertion: 
“Prisoners of war return home 
safely when the war is 
over.”
 W h i l e 
l e a f l e t  Z G 
109 touched 
upon the fact of 
Allied material 
superiority, the 
implications of this superiority for the individual 
German soldier was hammered home in “When 
All Hell Breaks Loose (ZG 82),” which was 
disseminated over Dunkirk on the night of 
13/14 November 1944.35 It tells him: “Today 
you are still alive. You fight with insufficient 
weapons, poorly equipped, surrounded by half-
trained units. But—you are alive.” Pointing out 
to the German soldier that “thousands of your 
comrades, many of your own friends, have died,” 
the leaflet reiterates three more times that the 
soldier reading the leaflet was still alive. But for 
how long? In the most emotion-laden language 
of any of the PWD leaflets considered in our 
sample, it continues: “Tomorrow all hell may 
break loose…Tomorrow: sudden uninterrupted 
barrages from guns of all calibres, continuous 
dive-bombing, thousands of flying fortresses and 
carpets of bombs; tanks, anti-tank rockets, and 
the new flame throwers. Everything you have seen 
so far was child’s play compared with 
that. Tomorrow: Hell.” And 
what of the day after 
Sporting the seals of the 
British and American armies 
and a facsimile of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s signature, this 
leaflet seemed like an official 
contract to many of its German 
recipients. The Psychological 
Warfare Division deemed it one of 
its most successful leaﬂets. 
With its emotion-laden 
language, this Psychological 
Warfare Division leaﬂet 
emphasizes what Allied material 
superiority would mean to the 
poorly equipped German soldier: 
death, permanent disability, or 
capture. The smart soldier would 
accept that conditions forced his 
surrender. 
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tomorrow? The leaflet states: “Day after tomorrow 
it will be over and you will be either dead, a cripple, 
or a prisoner of war. The decision about that is 
perhaps in your own hands…WHAT IS YOUR 
CHOICE?” The obverse of the leaflet asks the 
soldier: “WHAT IS TO BE DONE?” Instructing 
him to study the options in advance of battle so 
that he will be prepared to make an instantaneous 
decision, the leaflet outlines steps to follow for 
individual and group surrender, noting that “to 
avoid dangerous misunderstandings, the white 
flag should be waved clearly.” It concludes by 
outlining the treatment accorded to prisoners of 
war by the Allies, a repetition of the main points 
of the Geneva Convention.
 As Allied forces moved into Germany, PWD 
prepared leaflets that addressed both soldiers 
and civilians. “What Capitulation Means (ZG 
97),” disseminated over Saarbrucken and Borken 
areas the night of 14/15 January 1945, and 
which outlines what this act meant and what it 
did not mean on both a small and large scale, is 
an example of this type of leaflet.36 On a small 
scale, the leaflet explains, capitulation meant that 
German soldiers recognized “the hopelessness of 
the local situation” just as Allied commanders had 
done in Singapore, Tobruk and on Corregidor. 
For this same reason, German surrenders had 
taken place “in the East and West where it was 
recognized, strictly for military reasons, that 
further loss of life was no longer justified.” At 
the same time, a small scale capitulation did 
NOT mean that the soldier “will be subject to the 
enemy’s whim,” for “he is protected by the Geneva 
Convention which contains detailed instructions 
regarding his treatment, food, shelter, etc. and 
provided…that prisoners of war must be returned 
home as soon as possible after the peace has been 
signed.” On a large scale, capitulation meant 
that the “hopelessness of the overall situation is 
being recognized.” This section also served as an 
opportunity to declare in no uncertain terms the 
war aims of the Allies: unconditional surrender 
and “No promises and no dealings with the Nazis!” 
On a large scale, capitulation did NOT mean 
mass retaliation against all Germans. Quoting 
President Roosevelt, the leaflet reads: 
“The United Nations do 
no t  in t end  to 
enslave 
the German people. It is our desire to give 
the German people an opportunity to become 
useful, and respected members of the European 
community of nations.” While the front of the 
leaflet notes that soldiers who capitulate will 
be treated “with full honors (sic),” the obverse 
is photographic proof of this statement. It is 
captioned: “With full military honours the 
surrender of 19,000 German soldiers took 
place in Central France on 17th September 
1944. The picture shows (right) an American 
Major-General returning the salute of a German 
Major-General and an American Colonel. The 
German staff is in the foreground.” The reverse 
of subtle, this leaflet and others like it constituted 
a response to Goebbels’ propaganda, which 
told the German people that “defeat meant 
total physical destruction of Germany, the total 
impoverishment of its economic life, and the total 
reign of unrelieved terror for its inhabitants.”37
Conclusion
Objects of curiosity to the social historian today, were the 12 leaflets studied here 
viewed in the same light by the soldiers who 
picked them up during the Second World War? 
Or did they play the subversive role for which 
they had been designed? And can we determine if 
Allied and German soldiers responded similarly 
or differently to them? Although such questions 
spring immediately to mind in any exploration of 
leaflets, we recognize that we can offer only tentative 
answers for analyses conducted at the time and 
subsequently are themselves inconclusive. While 
some respond with a resounding yes, others 
disagree, and still others withhold judgment, 
citing lack of adequate evidence. Fully cognisant 
of the limitations of the exercise, we nonetheless 
conclude with a brief exploration of the variety 
of attitudes concerning the efficacy of aerial 
leaflets, including the twelve 
advocating surrender.
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Those who argue that PWD leaflets were effective 
rely on a number of different sources of evidence, 
one of which was the Nazi response to the Allied 
leaflet campaign. The threats and punishment 
meted out to those soldiers found harbouring 
leaflets proved, as an Office of War Information 
indoctrination pamphlet entitled “Leaflets—
Propaganda in Battle Dress” declared, that the 
“Hun didn’t regard leaflets as harmless. He hated 
and feared leaflets. Indeed he threatened, cajoled, 
punished and generally went to a great deal of 
trouble to try and prevent them from being read. 
And why? Because he knew that one single leaflet 
falling into the right hands may do large and 
lasting damage.”38 
 The efficacy of PWD and SKE leaflets can 
be demonstrated sufficiently, some argued both 
during and after the war, through anecdotal 
evidence. For example, James Erdmann 
maintains that comments made by Obergefreiter 
Erwin Griesbach, an “unimportant Wehrmacht 
soldier” who surrendered voluntarily on 26 
February 1945, proved that tactical and strategic 
leaflets were effective in combination. Griesbach 
reported that he “had been impressed with the ‘Ei 
Sörrender’ leaflet, the English phrases of which 
he had been practising against the possibility 
that his unit would be surrounded.” He also 
informed his interrogators that “[t]he leaflet 
helps the Landser to cross the bridge between 
wanting and not wanting to. It makes the decision 
easier for him by showing him the way.”39 For his 
part, German propagandist SS Obersturmfuerer 
Fernau, responding to criticisms of the work of 
Skorpion West,40 wrote on 15 November 1944 that 
“[t]he success of our work is beyond question and 
has been confirmed from the highest authorities, 
whilst recently some Ic’s have confirmed it by 
advising us of their suspicion that some enemy 
units have been withdrawn temporarily or 
permanently from the front-line as a result of 
our propaganda.”41 In the same vein, assessing 
in 1954 German propaganda directed against 
the French, Paul Leverkuehn concluded that 
leaflets had been successful: “[I]t was confirmed 
by the interrogation of prisoners and from other 
sources that these subversive pamphlets had, in 
fact, found their way to the troops; many of the 
prisoners still had the leaflets in their possession 
and produced them in support of their claims for 
preferential treatment.”42
 But not  al l  authors agree that  the 
aforementioned evidence was sufficient to prove 
the efficacy of propaganda leaflets. For example, 
addressing the Nazi response to Allied leaflets, 
professor Edward A. Shils, who served with the 
American Office of Strategic Services during the 
Second World War, suggests that it should be 
attributed “more to the hypersensitivity of the 
Nazis, who themselves greatly overemphasized 
the importance of propaganda, than to the 
actual responsiveness of the miserable Germans 
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to whom they were addressed.”43 Rejecting 
prisoner of war feedback as adequate proof 
of the effectiveness of Allied leaflets, Charles 
Cruickshank argues in The Fourth Arm: 
Psychological Warfare, 1938-1945 that to have 
asked captured German personnel if they had 
been affected by propaganda likely would have 
only elicited the response that the prisoners 
believed their captors wished to hear.44 For his 
part, SS Obersturmfuerer Fernau, selective in 
his acceptance or rejection of anecdotal evidence 
depending on whether it proved the efficacy 
of German leaflets or not, similarly distrusted 
prisoner of war comments. He maintained 
that, rather than eagerly providing the desired 
response as the German POW was believed to 
have done, the Allied prisoner of war scornfully 
denied being affected by “Nazi propaganda.”45 
 Arguments for and against the efficacy of leaflet 
propaganda are plentiful. Equally numerous 
are those who argue that it is impossible to 
conclude whether or not leaflets were effective. 
Thus, Anthony Rhodes in Propaganda: The Art 
of Persuasion in World War II, maintains that 
for propaganda to have been effective, affected 
individuals should not have realized that they 
had even assimilated the message.46 Determining 
the efficacy of such propaganda would have been 
impossible. For his part, Daniel Lerner argues 
that there simply is insufficient evidence to 
prove the efficacy of leaflets. He also maintains, 
however, there is equally insufficient evidence to 
disprove their efficacy.47
 In our assessment of leaflet efficacy, however, 
we accept that argument which holds that 
although difficult to measure, leaflets likely 
had “some demonstrable and helpful results if 
the surrounding military circumstances were 
favorable.”48 Even when bolstered by military 
successes, propaganda leaflets would not have 
spurred immediate action. Instead, they operated 
through a process of gradual attrition of the 
opponent’s morale. For this reason, some argue, 
German propaganda enjoyed success in France 
in 1939 and early 1940.49 Similarly, there is 
reason to believe that PWD leaflets played a role 
in encouraging Wehrmacht soldiers to surrender 
in the final months of the war. And it is for this 
reason that we suggest that SKE leaflets very 
likely had only limited impact on Allied personnel 
in 1944-45. Vicious as the fighting was during the 
last year of the war, the Allies achieved success 
after success, and the anecdotal evidence which 
records Allied scepticism seems tenable. While 
the leaflets were often read, particularly if they 
were amusing, the majority of them probably did 
end up as toilet paper.50 “Bomber” Harris may not 
be the most representative Allied serviceman but 
his comments regarding German leaflets are still 
worth quoting: “Our reaction to pamphleteering 
had always been to jeer and at the most to keep 
some of their leaflets as souvenirs.”51  
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